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Abstract: Commercial aviation is currently one of the safest modes of transportation; however, human
error is still one major contributing cause of aeronautical accidents and incidents. One promising
avenue to further enhance flight safety is Neuroergonomics, an approach at the intersection of
neuroscience, cognitive engineering and human factors, which aims to create better human–system
interaction. Eye-tracking technology allows users to “monitor the monitoring” by providing insights
into both pilots’ attentional distribution and underlying decisional processes. In this position paper,
we identify and define a framework of four stages of step-by-step integration of eye-tracking systems
in modern cockpits. Stage I concerns Pilot Training and Flight Performance Analysis on-ground; stage
II proposes On-board Gaze Recordings as extra data for the “black box” recorders; stage III describes
Gaze-Based Flight Deck Adaptation including warning and alerting systems, and, eventually, stage
IV prophesies Gaze-Based Aircraft Adaptation including authority taking by the aircraft. We illustrate
the potential of these four steps with a description of incidents or accidents that we could certainly
have avoided thanks to eye-tracking. Estimated milestones for the integration of each stage are
also proposed together with a list of some implementation limitations. We believe that the research
institutions and industrial actors of the domain will all benefit from the integration of the framework
of the eye-tracking systems into cockpits.
Keywords: eye-tracking; eye movements; assistive technologies; human factors; neuroergonomics;
aircraft cockpit
1. Introduction
Commercial aviation is one of the safest modes of transportation nowadays with less than one
accident per million departures [1]. This relatively low rate of accidents, which were 20–30 times
higher in the 1960s, is mostly due to the technological progress of aeronautical systems, but also due to
improvements in pilot training, flight crew and air traffic control procedures. Technical failure today is
the cause of only about 10% of accidents, leaving a significant percentage as the implications of human
factors. The exact values vary over years and sources and, as illustrated in Figure 1, approximately 60
to 80 percent of aviation accidents involve human error [2]. In particular, today’s low rate of overall
accidents is due to the introduction of automation [3]. However, it has also shifted the role of the
crew from direct (manual) controllers to supervisors. Unfortunately, automation is not always fully
understood nor surveilled correctly [4] and this can generate complacency [5]. This phenomenon can
promote the failure of the crew to monitor flight instruments properly because of over-reliance on
automation. Thus, the adequate, active visual monitoring of the flight parameters in the cockpit is an
essential piloting skill and becomes one of the most critical issues for flight safety [6].
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Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a final training rule that 
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improve piloting procedures [12]. In a recent survey [13], 75% of pilots answered that a publication 
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complex attentional and cognitive processes underlying piloting. Neuroergonomics [14] proposes 
using physiological tools to find valid and robust measures of human behavior and cognitive 
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(www.baaa-acro.com).
The supervision of the flight deck is performed by two pilots, namely the Pilot Flying (PF) and
the Pilot Monitoring (PM), whose roles are defined by standard operation procedures [7]. The PF
is responsible for controlling the flight (e.g., trajectory and energy) and gives orders to the PM. He
fulfills these responsibilities by either supervising the auto-pilot and the auto-thrust when engaged, or
hand-flying the aircraft. The PM is responsible for systems-related tasks and the monitoring of the flight
instruments. He/she also performs actions requested by the PF such as radio communications, systems
configurations and automatic mode selections. Eventually, the PM is responsible for monitoring the
PF to cross-check his/her actions, to inform of any deviation of the flight parameters and backup
if necessary.
However, maintaining an excellent monitoring performance is not easy. As Casner and
Schooler [8] showed in their recent study of airline pilots in a high-fidelity simulator, when pilots are
free to monitor, i.e., there is not a particular defined task, monitoring lapses often occur. In this sense,
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in their accident review of major flight-crew-involved
accidents between 1978 and 1990 [9] found that inadequate monitoring and cross-checking had
occurred during more than 80% of accidents. However, even if the pilots are nowadays aware of the
critical importance of adequate monitoring, accidents with monitoring lapses as contributing factors
still occur. One recent example was the Asiana Airlines flight 214 accident in 2013. A change in the
autopilot mode (which resulted in the deactivation of the automatic airspeed control) went unnoticed
by the crew, as well as the subsequent drastic diminution of the speed. This lack of monitoring
provoked a destabilized approach, with a below acceptable glide path and an excessive descent rate.
The landing gear finally struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport [10]. Three passengers
were fatally injured, with 49 other people receiving serious injuries; the airplane was destroyed by the
impact and subsequent fire.
Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a final training rule that requires
enhanced pilot monitoring training to be incorporated into existing air careers training programs [11],
the compliance date being March 2019. Also, the Bureau Enquêtes-Accidents (BEA), the French
investigation agency, recommended studying pilots’ monitoring with eye-tracking to improve piloting
procedures [12]. In a recent survey [13], 75% of pilots answered that a publication of detailed
information regarding the required visual patterns for the different phases of flight (for example,
take-off, approach) could help them to enhance monitoring skills.
Consequently, the great challenge is to improve the pilot–aircraft interaction by considering the
complex attentional and cognitive processes underlying piloting. Neuroergonomics [14] proposes
using physiological tools to find valid and robust measures of human behavior and cognitive processes,
such as attention. For example, electroencephalography [15], electrocardiography [16] or functional
infra-red spectroscopy [17] are often used in flight/drive simulators to study cognitive and attentional
states. However, none of these techniques can properly take measures remotely without direct contact
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with the human body. Meanwhile, the remote character of such a measurement device is one of the
essential criteria to measure human attentional and cognitive behavior inside the cockpit, especially
during emergency situations. To highlight the importance of this point, let us take the example of the
tragic, well-known flight AF-447 [18] from Rio de Janeiro to Paris that in 2009, after an aerodynamic
stall, crashed over the Atlantic Ocean, taking 228 lives. As the captain interrupted his in-flight rest
and returned in an emergency to the cockpit, it is difficult to imagine him calmly putting on some
wearable device and proceeding to a calibration, while vital decisions were to be made. It is worth
noting that there exist signal processing techniques that allow heart rate or body temperature to be
estimated from video frames remotely. Nevertheless, these data are difficult to interpret and, especially,
it is challenging to disentangle emotional reactions from the cognitive activity. There exist wireless
alternatives, such as watches or smart shirts that can monitor these parameters. However, wireless data
transfer may result in cybersecurity vulnerabilities and therefore is not recommended for transferring
information relevant to flight safety.
Since eye-tracking devices can be directly embedded in the cockpit panel, one promising avenue
is to consider this technology. Researchers have been publishing results of eye movements studies for
over 60 years. However, the market of commercial eye trackers has been considerably democratized
only during the last decade, and such devices today are non-invasive (can be remotely used without
direct contact with the body), relatively inexpensive, reliable and, importantly, eye-tracking data can
be available in near real time. All these advantages make the integration of eye trackers in modern
flight decks realistic.
Due to the fact that “high definition” images are restricted to a small region called the fovea,
humans need to shift their eyes constantly from one area to another to explore and monitor their
environment. The raw data samples from an eye tracker can serve to detect basic oculomotor events [19]
such as fixations, during which we acquire useful visual information, and saccades, that serve to
change the location of the visual focus. These events allow the monitoring of ocular behavior and
give insights into the perceptual and cognitive processes [20] underlying reading, free viewing, and
decision-making (see, for example, [21,22]).
The use of eye-tracking in aeronautics is far from new. Starting with pioneer studies by Fitts and
colleagues around 1950 conducted in a flight simulator [23–25], many researchers have performed
experiments on pilots equipped with an eye tracker system. During his work, based on forty pilots’
data, Fitts concluded that different flight instruments were checked with variable frequencies and
required a different fixation length. He also found that more experienced pilots had a tendency to make
shorter fixations. Researchers have reproduced these results since then, but it was the first time that the
recording of eye movements was demonstrated to be a valuable method of evaluating pilots’ ocular
behavior. At the time, researchers were confronted by the complexity of the recording set-up and
elaborate manual analysis procedures. Nowadays, on the contrary, an eye tracker system can be easily
embedded in a flight simulator or even a real aircraft. Thus, eye-tracking has already been successfully
used to conduct high-fidelity flight simulator experiments [26–28] and real flight experiments [29,30].
These recent and promising advances in eye-tracking demonstrate the need for conceptualizing
its integration into the cockpit. In the following section, we identify and define a framework of four
stages of eye-tracking integration in modern cockpits. These four stages are (I) Pilot Training, (II),
On-board Gaze Recording, (III) Gaze-Based Flight Deck and (IV) Aircraft Adaptations. We support each
stage with a description of relevant incidents or accidents and explain in what way the eye-tracking
integration can enhance flight safety. An estimated milestone for the integration of each stage is also
proposed together with a list of some implementation limitations.
2. Four Stages of Eye-Tracking Integration
In this section, we identify and define four stages of eye-tracking technology integration in the
piloting activity. The first stage relates to pilot training on-ground, whereas the other three stages
correspond to operational flight situations. We highlight the interest of the eye-tracking in each of the
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four stages (with examples of aeronautical incidents/accidents for stages III and IV), give an estimated
integration date milestone in years, and consider some implementation and use limitations. Figure 2
presents a flowchart of this eye-tracking integration, showing the positioning of each of the four stages.
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2.1. Stage I: Pilot Training/Flight Perfor ance nalysis
In line ith the recent training rule published by F in 2013 [11], hich requires airlines to
include a specific training progra to i prove onitoring by arch 2019, one ajor axis of flight
safety i prove ent is pilot training. In stage I of pilot training and flight perfor ance analysis,
eye-tracking data can be exploited in three different ays: as a flight expertise esti ate, for incident
debriefing and for exa ple-based learning.
First of all, the eye-tracking data can be used to obtain an esti ate of pilots’ onitoring (flight)
skills. In their review of eye-tracking research in various domains (such as radiology, car driving, sports,
and chess), Gegenfurtner and his colleagues [31] concluded that experts (compared to less experienced
professionals) have, in general, shorter fixation durations during the comprehension of visualizations.
This echoes Fitts’ previous conclusion about experienced pilots and their shorter fixation durations [23].
In the helicopter domain, during a simulated overland navigation task, Sullivan et al. [32] found
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an estimate of expertise cost (or rather benefit) on scan management skill. Their model predicted
that, on average, for every additional thousand flight hours, the median dwell time will decrease by
28 ms, and the number of transitions between zones of interest (out-the-window and navigational
map) will significantly increase. In their review of the literature on eye-movements in medicine
and chess, Reingold and Sheridan [33] called it “superior perceptual encoding” of domain-related
patterns. However, this perceptual advantage is not the only thing gained with expertise. It is
closely related to the global processing advantage and knowledge of relevant visual patterns. Thus,
Gegenfurtner et al. [31] found, for example, that experts fixate more on task-relevant areas and spend
less time fixating on relevant information. This visual strategy of “information-reduction” [34] that
helps to optimize the visual information processing by separation of task-relevant from task-irrelevant
information, was also found to differentiate expert from novice pilots in aviation [35,36]. For example,
Schriver and colleagues [37] compared the distribution of visual attention using eye-tracking between
experienced and novice pilots during problem diagnosis in a flight simulator. They found, in particular,
that faster correct decisions by experts during trouble diagnosis were accompanied by a correct
attending of cues relevant to that failure. Van Meeuwen et al. [38] compared visual strategies of air
traffic controllers with a different level of expertise and found that experts had more effective strategies,
and that, furthermore, the scan paths were more similar between expert controllers compared with
novices. More recently, a study of both PF and PM eye movements during the approach revealed that
the PM’s attentional allocation was not optimal, especially during the short final. It corresponded to
a high percentage of dwell time out of the window to the detriment of the processing of the flight
parameters, such as the energy of the aircraft [39]. Similar measurements performed by Lefrançois and
colleagues [13] showed that the gaze allocation of pilots, who failed to stabilize the approach, was not
optimal compared to the pilots who succeeded. These results suggest that there is an optimal visual
scan path for a given visual problem that can be acquired with years of expertise, but that can also be
learned with eye-movement educational examples.
Secondly, recorded movie clips where the eye gaze position is superimposed on the visual
scene could be used in training programs as example-based learning. Such eye movement modeling
examples were already successfully applied during cooperative problem-solving [40] and clinical
visual observation [41,42]. Gaze following is a natural and innate tool of the learning [43], including
the causal one. It allows the learner to discover what information is relevant and how to guide their
attention for a given goal by following the expert’s gaze. Jarodzka and colleagues [44] argued that the
attentional guidance by gaze following is not only effective at improving current performance, but
also at fostering learning. Earlier, Nalanagula and colleagues [45] also suggested that gaze following
improves training for visual inspection tasks. Recently, Leff and colleagues [46] showed that trainees’
performance is enhanced when experts’ gaze guides their visual attention in a surgery context.
Eventually, the movie clips of replayed pilots’ eye movements could be used for subsequent
analysis and debriefing. Pilots do often request the recordings of flight parameters after a non-routine
event to understand better what happened during an incident and how to prevent it in the future. It is
impossible (and unnecessary) to remember all the eye movements we perform. Moreover, the majority
of fixation patterns are automatic and unconscious. Therefore, a replay of the attentional behavior
during a simulated session, or a real flight (in the case of later integration of eye-tracking systems),
would allow the pointing out of attentional errors by pilots, such as an excessive focus on a particular
flight parameter or, on the contrary, its disregard. Let us note, however, that the user-friendly and
synthetic representation of eye movement recordings is not straightforward [47], and that further
research is needed to provide intuitive tools to support analysis and reviewing of the eye-tracking
data. Thorough research is also needed to provide evidence that these eye movement examples can
effectively foster pilots’ learning.
To conclude this stage I, we suggest that eye-tracking technology is fairly useful for pilots’ training
on the ground because (1) we can debrief their behavior by studying gaze patterns; (2) visual scan
paths can be learned by gaze following; and (3) monitoring skills can be estimated using eye-tracking
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data. The present stage can be already integrated and adopted by airline companies around the
world by using relatively inexpensive head-mounted eye-trackers available today on the market or by
incorporating a remote eye tracker system in their training flight simulator.
2.2. Stage II: On-Board Gaze Recording
Eye-tracking has potential, not only on-ground for pilot training and flight skills analysis, but
also in operational settings. The first step of operational use is a recording of the crew’s points of
gaze to facilitate incident/accident investigations. All modern aircraft are equipped with a black box
comprising a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder for recording information, required
for crash investigation purposes. Obviously, pilots do not verbalize all their actions. Therefore, flight
parameters and voice recordings are sometimes simply not enough to accurately reconstruct the course
of events. Eye-tracking technology can enhance these devices by also recording the gaze data. First, the
tracking of pilots’ gaze is useful for accident aftermath to verify at which flight instruments the pilots
looked. The analysis of these data would help to deeply understand the failures in the human–system
interaction (“Did the crew fail to perceive a critical warning? If so, why?”) that lead to an incident,
and to avoid future repetition of the same circumstances. Secondly, pilots do not look exclusively
outside or on the cockpit instrument panel, they also monitor one another’s activity. In particular,
they observe one another’s hands when they press a button, move the engine lever or point at a
display [48]. Pointing in the airline cockpit is an important part of piloting; it guides one’s own and
the other’s visual attention and helps to establish shared situation awareness [49]. Thus, a recording
of the pilots’ gaze could help investigation agencies to infer joint awareness and crew coordination.
Moreover, these data would be beneficial for cockpit manufacturers, revealing the effectiveness of
their user interfaces and leading to design improvement. Similar benefits for the design of operational
procedures are expected.
However, although technologically feasible, we recognize that the process of introducing an
on-board gaze recording might take some time. For example, the Transportation Safety Board of
Canada indicates, in a recent reassessment of the responses to aviation safety, recommendations
concerning cockpit image-recording systems [50] that “since 1999, the NTSB has issued 14
recommendations to the FAA related to the installation of cockpit image-recording systems. To all but a
single recommendation, the NTSB has assessed the FAA responses as unacceptable”. The recent NTSB’s
safety recommendation [51] requires that each aircraft be retrofitted with a crash-protected cockpit
image recording system that should “be capable of recording, in color, a view of the entire cockpit
including each control position and each action (such as display selections or system activations) taken
by people in the cockpit.” Let us also note that, contrary to the cockpit image-recording systems, this
stage does not necessarily interfere with the pilots’ privacy. The gaze recordings are impersonal and
should record exclusively a gaze point within an established 3D-model of a given cockpit, or the name
of the corresponding area of interest chosen from an exhaustive list of all the flight deck instruments
and visual displays. Thus, the eye-tracking recording would not entail any privacy infringement (such
as recording of pilots’ faces).
In the future, the cockpit voice recorder should be promoted to a human data recorder by also
recording the gaze data. These data should comprise two channels to keep points of the gaze of both
the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. Such application is already possible today because it would
not have any safety effects and, therefore, does not have to meet any failure probability requirement.
A significant limitation of this stage is that the recordings should provide an accurate testimony of
flight events. Therefore, it is mandatory to have an eye-tracking system of excellent quality, high
precision and robustness. Such on-board gaze recordings would provide valuable documentation for
safety boards to improve incident and accident investigations and may take the form of an additional
column (e.g., “currently gazed area”) of data in the flight data recorder. These data can be used by
the flight crew or by the airline companies for the post-flight debriefing. For example, if a particular
event occurs during a flight, the flight crew or companies might want to review the visual circuits
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at the time of the problem. In any case, as for the training stage, there is a need for a tool that eases
data analysis and reviewing. Such volumes of data are difficult to process immediately and further
research is needed to handle the large size of eye-tracking data. Altogether, we speculate that the early
adaptation of such gaze recording will emerge within 5 years, the principal requirement being high
reliability, precision and accuracy. If such a device would necessitate a calibration procedure, the setup
should be quick and simple (for example, during the preflight checklist).
2.3. Stage III: Gaze-Based Flight Deck Adaptation
The gaze recording is the simplest, but not the only, possible use of eye-tracking technology
in operational settings. Numerous studies have successfully used eye-tracking to detect different
degraded cognitive states such as spatial disorientation [52], fatigue [53,54], attentional tunneling [55],
or automation surprise [26]. Except for the adverse cognitive states, eye-tracking can also be used to
infer one’s intentions. Thus, for example, Peysakhovich et al. [56] showed that eye movements and
pupil size could be predictive of upcoming decision-making in a simulated maritime environment. In
the automobile domain, Zhou et al. [57], proposed a method to infer the intention of a truck driver to
change lanes based on eye-movements. Ha et al. [58] showed that it is possible to guess the thoughts
of a nuclear power plant operator using his or her eye movements. All these results let us imagine
an operational support system that assists flight crews using human eye data as an input. Such
an enhancement of the flight deck would take the human psycho-physiological state into account
using the eye-tracking data collected in real-time. An aircraft would thus adapt itself explicitly using
the information derived from the crew’s gaze. Note, nevertheless, that if such a support tool was
considered as part of the aircraft system, safety objectives might be applied. Thus, if the failure of such
a system would have a minor safety effect (minor safety condition may include a slight reduction in
functional capabilities and a small increase in crew workload), then the aviation certification imposes
at least 10−3 allowable failure probability [59]. As long as modern video-based eye-tracking systems
cannot guarantee even the eye capture for 99.9% of the time (because of luminosity and geometry
problems), it will take some time before the eye-tracking technology, and the corresponding market,
will evolve and achieve sufficient reliability. Moreover, much high-quality research is to be done to
detect critical and complex cognitive states properly. However, the eye-tracking can be used in a
simpler manner to detect the presence or the absence of an eye fixation on relevant information in
the cockpit.
To better understand how useful an eye-tracking system can be in operational flight situations, let
us consider the following incident. An Air France Boeing 777-200 performing flight AF-471 was about
to land at Paris Charles de Gaulle on 16 November 2011 [60]. During the approach, while the aircraft
was stabilized on the descent path, a Master Warning alarm indicated that the automatic landing mode
had changed and this was called out by the relief pilot. According to the operator’s instructions, in
this case, a go-around should be called out and initiated, as was done by the PM. Then, according
to the protocol, the PF should handle, in particular, the thrust and the pitch, while the PM should
manage the configuration change of the flaps. However, the PF erroneously and unintentionally
pushed the auto-throttle disconnection switch instead of the Takeoff/Go-around switch that engages
the go-around modes. Therefore, his nose-up inputs were contradictory with the auto-pilot system
that was trying to keep the airplane on the descent trajectory. Meanwhile, the PM fully concentrated
his attention on monitoring the retraction of flaps, a process which takes about ten seconds. The PM’s
failure to properly monitor the aircraft’s attitude (position) and energy state had resulted in a brief loss
of flight path and late adaptation of the go-around pitch. Thankfully, a third relief pilot was on board
and made two deviation callouts of “pitch attitude” that led the pilots to apply the nose-up input.
In the report’s conclusion, the BEA underlined that “the serious incident was due to the inadequate
monitoring of flight parameters by the flight crew” [60]. Indeed, without the relief pilot on board who
called out the pitch attitude, such behavior in the ground proximity could have resulted in a controlled
flight into terrain, the second most recurrent type of accident [1].
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One of the reasons for the temporary loss of control was the PM’s excessive focus on the flaps’
position indicator. Thus, he was ignoring the information on the aircraft’s attitude indicator (showing
the artificial horizon with bank and pitch angles), flight mode annunciator (to verify if the automatic
modes were consistent with actions) and engine parameters. Both the lack of pitch monitoring and the
excessive focus on flap configuration could be detected with an eye-tracking system. Thus, the first
would be expressed as an absence of fixation on the attitude indicator, while the latter would induce
an excessively long fixation on flap control. Once such an event was detected, and, in particular, when
an aircraft is about to exceed the nominal flight envelope, a counter-measure could be applied to the
crew. For instance, a brief retraction of the display of flap configuration could disengage the PM from
the flaps and make him allocate some attention to the energy state and pitch attitude. A discrete, but
visible, highlight of these two latter parameters to attract the crew’s attention is also feasible.
Skippers Aviation de Havilland Dash 8-300 performing a charter flight to Laverton on 17 May 2012,
is another example of an incident with degraded situation awareness as a contributing factor [61]. While
conducting a visual circling approach to the runway, a high descent rate triggered the aircraft’s warning
system. Despite the alarm, the crew continued their approach, despite the operator’s procedures
stipulating a go-around initiation in this situation. As noted in the safety board report [61], “the crew’s
monitoring of the aircraft’s rate of descent and altitude relative to the minimum stabilization height
was secondary to their monitoring of their position in relation to the ground. This external focus
degraded the crew’s overall situation awareness”. Thus, the crew was focused on descending through
a break in the cloud and did not respond correctly to the sink rate alert and continued their approach.
As in the previous situation, this unstable approach incident could have been avoided by re-engaging
the captain and the first officer’s attention to the rate of descent and altitude monitoring. The first
necessary step to do so is to detect the pilots’ excessive fixation on the runway environment. Next,
a brief counter-measure could be applied to disengage the captain and the first officer’s attention
from the outside. Such a counter-measure would reorient their attention to the rate of descent and the
altitude, which are necessary parameters to determine whether or not the approach is stabilized.
When eye-tracking systems are reliable enough to capture the crew’s gazes in all conditions
(different visual angles, head movements, turbulences, luminance), the stage III of gaze-based flight
deck adaptation will be relatively easy to implement, at least at some basic level of logic. For example,
for each instrument within the cockpit, with knowledge of the system and according to the flight
phase (determined by real-time analysis of relevant flight parameters such as position, altitude and
speed), one may define the following: (1) maximum allowed dwell time; and (2) maximum allowed
time without monitoring. Then, if we detect that one of the rules is broken, a counter-measure could
be applied. For instance, if the descent rate was not monitored (with a fixation) for some time by
neither the Pilot Flying nor the Pilot Monitoring during the descent phase, an auditory alert may be
played back. Alternatively, if we detect an extremely long fixation on flap configuration, for instance,
the information can be retracted for a short period to re-engage the pilot’s attention. Nevertheless,
before such an alerting system can be implemented, it is necessary to sort all the possible sources
of information by priority order according to each flight phase and aircraft configuration. Indeed,
information overload is one of the factors that promote pilots’ inadequate monitoring. Therefore, the
system should carefully choose what information should be provided and verify that it is necessarily
essential for the flight safety. It is also worth noting that gazing at an instrument does not guarantee
that the information is processed, which is often referred to as “looked but failed to see”. However, it
is possible to reduce the risk of not seeing the information and to prevent “not looked therefore failed”
using the eye-tracking [62]. Figure 3 illustrates this simple logic in the form of a flowchart of stage
III. Taking all of this into account, we speculate that the early adaptation of such gaze-based support
systems may occur within a decade.
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red pathway concerns an excessive focus on a particular instrument. The green pathway concerns a
lack of instruments’ monitoring. In this example, the visual behavior database consists of a set of rules
concerning maximum allowed values (a fixation duration, a time between two fixations) as a function
of both instrument and flight context.
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2.4. Stage IV: Gaze-Based Aircraft Adaptation
Eventually, the final and most distant (because of immature technology) step of the eye-tracking
integration in the cockpit, is the gaze-based aircraft adaptation. To palliate humans’ limited attentional
and cognitive resources, different counter-measures and automation changes can be used and triggered
using the pilot’s estimated attentional state. This stage can be combined with the previous stage III
to provide the crew with some feedback about aircraft system changes. At stage IV, we propose to
allow the automation to change the aircraft’s configuration or to take authority based on the crew’s
gaze, and not only provide visualization enhancement and sonification as at stage III. For example,
the automation could temporarily take authority over the crew in the case of incapacity of the human
operator [63–65]. Such authority policy, for instance, already exists in F-16 fighters and will be accepted
in the next standard version of Dassault Rafale fighters. The aircraft automatically perform an auto-pull
maneuver if the pilot does not properly react to avoid an upcoming controlled flight into terrain. In
this example, however, the automatic maneuver is triggered at the last moment to leave more freedom
for the pilot. However, eye-tracking can help to anticipate erroneous visual circuits that may precede
degradation of the situation [56]. Important safety issues from such pilot–aircraft interaction imply
significant constraints on the probability of a failure condition. If such a system change would lead to
hull loss and fatal injury of the flight crew, then the lower limit of the probability of a failure condition
(classified as “catastrophic” in this case) should be between 10−6 and 10−9, depending on the aircraft
class [59].
Let us consider the following two examples to figure out how such gaze-based aircraft adaptation
could improve flight safety. A Flybe de Havilland Dash 8-400 was performing flight BE-1794 to Exeter
on 11 September 2010 [66]. During the approach, the crew, being distracted by an unfamiliar avionics
failure, forgot to monitor the flight path and descended below its cleared altitude. As states the report,
“both pilots became distracted from the primary roles of flying and monitoring the aircraft and did not
notice that “altitude select” and “vertical speed” modes were no longer engaged”. A terrain proximity
warning system alerted the crew that the airplane was more than 700 ft below the selected altitude.
After a difficult recovery, the aircraft continued to a safe landing.
Another similar incident occurred with the Flybe flight BEE247S on approach to Edinburgh
Airport on 23 December 2008 [67]. The aircraft descended below the glide slope, as the appropriate
mode of the flight director was not selected. An approach controller noticed it before the flight
crew. As contributory factors, the safety board report cited “an absence of appropriate monitoring
of the flight path and the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator)”. As mentioned earlier, this lack of flight
parameter surveillance can be detected by an eye-tracking system. It would be expressed as an absence
of fixations on the FMA, the descent rate and the altitude for some time. Within the integration
stage III, an auditory verbal alarm can remind the crew of the required visual controls during the
approach to palliate this oversight. In the case of stage IV, the difference is that the automation can
take the initiative. For example, in the case of the BE-1794 flight, the captain encountered a failure of
an Input–Output Processor and lost some of the primary flight display elements. He tried to regain
the indications of the primary flight display by switching the air data computer that disengaged the
“altitude select” and “vertical speed” modes. That did not help to recover the indications and, as the
pilot did not verify the FMA status, he was unaware of the disengagement of these modes. One could
imagine, that the aircraft re-engages the previously selected modes automatically (maybe with some
auditory feedback) without the proper FMA verification neither from the pilot flying nor the pilot
monitoring. This authority policy is an example of stage IV eye-tracking integration in the cockpit
when the aircraft takes over the pilot input if degraded situational awareness was detected. Bearing in
mind both the present insufficient reliability of the eye-tracking system and significant consequences
of false detection of degraded situational awareness, we speculate that the early adaptation of this
stage IV is not to be expected within the next 20 years. Table 1 concludes this section by providing a
few examples of possible eye-tracking usage within each of four integration stages.
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Table 1. Gaze data usage examples within each of the four integration stages.
Integration Stage Eye-Tracking Data Usage
Stage I: Pilot
training/Flight
Performance Analysis
• Movie clips with eye-movement modeling for example-based learning
• Statistics of dwell percentages on different instruments after a
training session
• Comparison of scan paths and fixation durations to evaluate the progress of
pilot trainees/estimate pilots’ skills
Stage II: On-Board Gaze
Recording
• Reconstruction of pilots’ visual attentional distribution during a flight for
incidents/accidents investigation
• Analysis of crew’s joint attention and shared situational awareness
Stage III: Gaze-Based
Flight Deck Adaptation
• Display a notification at the point of the pilot’s gaze to ensure its
visual processing
• Counter-measure an excessive focus on a parameter (expressed as an
extremely long fixation) by retracting the information for a short period or
highlighting the relevant ones to attract attention
• An auditory notification if a critical parameter (according to the flight phase)
is left without monitoring for a long period
Stage IV: Gaze-Based
Aircraft Adaptation
• Turn on an automation mode if the crew is considered as unable to pursue
the operation
• Perform an automatic maneuver
3. Conclusions
The aviation domain can benefit from the growth and maturation of eye-tracking technology to
further reduce the rate of incidents due to human factors. This paper is the first one of its genre to define
and retrace the framework consisting of four main stages for the integration of eye-tracking systems
into cockpits. We ordered these four steps in the chronological order of their possible implementation,
thus retracing the vector of the eye-tracking integration process into the cockpits. We believe that,
if used wisely, the eye-tracking technology can facilitate and accelerate pilot training, facilitate the
investigation of in-flight incidents and considerably enhance flight safety. While this paper reflects
upon the aviation domain, we also believe that this work will be useful for practitioners in other
domains such as automobile, air traffic control and command and control centers.
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